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Brentano’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality 
Mark Textor 
Department of Philosophy  
King’s College London  
London WC2R 2LS 
UK 
 
Abstract 
Brentano’s Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic 
philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes 
that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this 
assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can 
only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted 
from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to 
understand Brentano’s Thesis accordingly: It is a piece of advice on how to become 
introspectively aware of the distinctive feature of mental phenomena. On this 
understanding of Brentano’s Thesis standard objections to it no longer arise. 
 
1. Introduction 
Brentano’s Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic 
philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes 
that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this 
assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can 
only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted 
from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to 
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understand Brentano’s Thesis accordingly: It is a piece of advice on how to become 
introspectively aware of the distinctive feature of mental phenomena. On this 
understanding of Brentano’s Thesis standard objections to it no longer arise. 
 The paper has two parts. The first, historical part (sections 2-3) introduces 
central tenets of Brentano’s metaphilosophy. In section 2 I discuss Brentano’s 
Concept Originalism and in section 3 I go on to show how this method informs the 
work of Brentano and his students. The second part (sections 4-7) reconstructs 
Brentano’s Thesis in the light of this metaphilosophy and uses the result to deflect 
objections to Brentano’s Thesis. 
 
2. Brentano’s Concept Originalism 
Analytic philosophers aim to give analytic definitions, that is, they aim to decompose 
a given concept into its marks or characteristics. The marks of a concept are further, 
distinct concepts such that, necessarily, if an object x falls under all of them, x falls 
under the defined concept (and vice versa). Brentano concluded his lecture ‘On the 
Concept of Truth’ with a methodological sermon that is addressed to philosophers 
who focus on analytic definitions to the exclusion of other ways to clarify or 
otherwise illuminate concepts: 
 
We have been concerned with a definition, i.e. with the elucidation of a 
concept connected with a name. Many believe such elucidation always 
requires some general determination, and they forget that the ultimate and 
most effective means of elucidation must always consist in an appeal to the 
individual’s intuition, from which all our general characteristics [Merkmale] 
are derived. What would be the use of trying to elucidate the concepts red or 
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blue if I could not present one with something red or with something blue? All 
this has been disregarded by those who were concerned with the nominal 
definition of truth, whose history we have pursued. If, as I hope, we have 
succeeded in clarifying this cloudy [getrübte] concept, we have done so only 
by focusing primarily on examples of true judgements. […] Even now, after 
the elimination of confusions and misunderstandings, our definition would 
convey nothing to one who lacked the necessary intuition. (OCT, 17 [29]; my 
emphasis; I have changed the translation.)1 
 
Brentano reminds us that conceptual elucidation cannot always consist in defining a 
concept by decomposing it into its marks. Ultimately analytic definitions will come to 
an end: there are basic concepts that cannot be defined by decomposing them into 
marks. Our grasp of the defined concepts is only as good as our grasp of these 
‘building blocks’. If we assume that only analytic definitions will yield insight in the 
nature of concepts, we deprive ourselves of an understanding of the indefinable 
concepts. If conceptual elucidation is to be possible for indefinable concepts as well 
as for definable ones, a broader approach to conceptual elucidation is needed. What 
can this approach be?  
Brentano’s answer is implicit in his discussion of the concept good in his 
lecture On the Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (OKRW): 
 
In order to answer these questions [What is the nature of good?] in a 
satisfactory way we must first and foremost find the origin of the concept of 
                                                        
1 References to the pagination of the German texts are in square brackets. 
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good which, like the origin of all our concepts, lies in certain concrete intuitive 
presentations. (OKRW, 8 [16].)2 
 
Brentano’s lectures on ethics elaborate the same topic:3 
 
How are we to go about determining [bestimmen] the concept of the good? 
This is the first and the most urgent question, and everything depends upon its 
being answered. The task of determining a concept is very closely connected to 
the question as to the source from which we attain it. The explanation of a 
term is in the last analysis a reference to certain phenomena. Thus Hume was 
quite right when, in his famous investigation into the concept of causality, he 
introduced the question as to the origin of the concept. (FCA, 84-5 [135]; my 
emphasis, I have changed the translation of ‘bestimmen’.) 
 
Now the maxim ‘Find the origin of a concept’ needs further explanation. How does 
one follow it? What is the source or origin of a concept?  
Fortunately Brentano’s student Stumpf helps us to answer these questions. His 
1873 book Der psychologische Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (The Psychological 
Origin of the Presentation of Space) was written under the influence of Brentano and 
contains an explanation of the Brentanian methodology employed: 
By [‘]seeking out the psychological origin of a presentation [Vorstellung][’] 
we mean the seeking out of the presentations from which it arose, and the 
                                                        
2 In part my translation. Chisholm and Schneewind do not translate ‘in befriedigender 
Weise’ and ‘vor allem’. 
3 See also Stumpf 1939, 9. 
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manner in which it arose. First one will think of the analysis of presentation 
into simpler and simplest. Then we have to deal with the question whether 
only real presentations occur in the combination or whether it also contains 
phantasy presentations. (Stumpf 1873, 4; my translation) 
 
We seek out the origin of a presentation by asking ourselves from which other 
presentations in which manner it arose. There are two general kinds of origin of a 
presentation. 
(A) If we find concepts that are marks of the presentation, we have found its 
origin in other presentations and, at the same time, we have given an analysis of the 
presentation into its component marks. Answering the question what is the origin of 
the presentation is in this case analysing it.4 
(B) If we can’t give an analytic definition of a presentation, but find 
perceptions from which it can be abstracted, we have found the origin of the 
presentation without giving an analysis. One elucidates such a presentation by 
reversing the process of acquisition: one searches for the perceptions that gave rise to 
the concept and either episodically imagines having them or recalls them in order to 
focus one’s attention on them. 
An important role in (B) is played by the notions of intuition and abstraction. 
‘Intuition’ is in Brentano’s terminology just another word for ‘perception’, the non-
inferential acknowledgement of one or some things. Awareness is construed as a form 
of perception, inner perception.5  
                                                        
4 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out that origin and analysis are in 
some cases two side of the same coin. 
5 See PES, 70 [I, 128]. 
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Brentano’s views on abstraction change over time, but what remains constant 
is the claim that abstraction starts from a multitude of things that are simultaneously 
perceived.6 For example, we perceive several spatiotemporal things – particularised 
colours, shapes, smells – simultaneously. Through contrasts, we notice re-occurring 
features in the manifold and think of them in isolation. When we can attend to such 
features in isolation and recall them, we have formed a general concept by 
abstraction.  
In both (A) and (B) we have specified in which manner and from which source 
the presentation arose. Hence, inquiring after the origin of a concept is a unified 
method that applies to definable as well as to indefinable concepts. We must be able 
to acquire some concepts by abstraction from perceptions in order to prevent a vicious 
infinite regress or circle. In this sense, possession of any concept requires that one has 
had perceptions. Brentano found this idea in Aristotle.7 He refers his reader to De 
Anima III.8 where Aristotle says ‘one who did not perceive anything would neither 
learn nor understand anything’ (432a 8-9, Shields’s translation). Shields notes that De 
Anima III.8 has a consistent reading according to which Aristotle is ‘a robust 
empiricist about concept acquisition’ (Shields 2015, 346). Whether this form of 
empiricism is Aristotle’s considered view is an open question, but it is not an open 
question that Brentano interprets Aristotle this way and endorses empiricism about 
concept acquisition. 
3. Concept Originalism in Action 
Brentano and his students pursued a philosophical programme that is based on 
Concept Originalism. It will be helpful to have brief outline of this programme – I 
                                                        
6 For the following see LRU, 50 and SNB, 96. 
7 OKRW, 8 Fn. 18 [16, Fn. 18 on p. 53]. 
 7 
will call it the Würzburg-Vienna Plan – as background for the next sections. Brentano 
mentioned Hume in one of the previous quotes and Hume provides a helpful starting 
point for our outline. For Hume, a concept – read ‘idea’ – is nothing but a ‘faint copy’ 
of an impression. If you want to know more about an idea, finding the original helps 
clarify what the copy is. As Hume put it in his Inquiries: 
 
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is 
employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but 
enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be 
impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. (Hume 
1777, 22) 
 
If you can’t find the source of an idea, there may be none to be found and the words 
purporting to express it are in fact meaningless and should not be used in posing 
questions and formulating views. 
 Humean arguments, such as 
(P1) There is no impression of a necessary connection.  
Therefore: (C1) We have no idea of a necessary connection. 
Therefore: (C2) The term ‘necessary connection’ is a meaningless term that 
should be replaced by a term that signifies an idea. 
 
have not convinced everyone. The most influential response to Hume’s objection that 
there is no impression of an external relation from which the concept of a necessary 
connection is ‘copied’ is Kant’s. He wrote about Hume’s objection:  
 
 8 
 […] I tried first whether Hume’s objection might not be presented in a general 
manner, and I soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and 
effect is far from being the only concept through which the understanding 
thinks connections of things a priori; rather, metaphysics consists wholly of 
such concepts. I sought to entertain their number, and as I successfully 
attained this in the way I wished, namely from a single principle, I proceeded 
to the deduction of these concepts, from which I henceforth became assured 
that they were not, as Hume had feared, derived from experience, but had 
arisen from the pure understanding. (Kant 1783, 10) 
 
Kant concedes that there is no impression from which the idea of causality could be 
‘copied’. However, one needs to apply it, argued Kant, in order to distinguish between 
a succession of experiences and an experience of a (mind-independent) succession of 
events.8 A satisfactory Kantian response to Hume needs to show the indispensability 
of the contested concepts and find a different source for them.  
 Something similar goes for our presentations of space and time. They are not 
concepts, but a priori or pure intuitions.9 The intuition of space organises the initially 
non-spatial material, that is, our sensations. We can learn about these forms by teasing 
out the preconditions of experience of objects, but we cannot perceive space and time.  
They are not derived from experience, but presupposed in it. 
Brentano and his students attempt to show by means of a number of case 
studies that both Hume and Kant are wrong. They proceed by looking for the origin of 
a concept that is contested between Hume and Kant and argue against Hume that one 
                                                        
8 See Kant 1781, A192-3/B237-8. 
9 See Kant 1781, A24-26/B39. 
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can derive the concept from perception. There is therefore no need to look for a 
source of the concept in the faculty of understanding: Kant is wrong. A representative 
example is the concept of causation. In OKRW, Brentano mentions it as an example 
of  
 
concepts which some modern philosophers, failing to discover their true 
source, have tried to interpret as being a priori categories. (OKRW, 8 Fn. 18 
[16, Fn. 18 on p. 53]) 
 
Brentano argues that the concept of causation has its source in inner perception, 
namely our awareness of mental causation: 
 
 […] we note, for example, a causal relation between our belief in a set of 
premises and our judgements—those judgements which affirm or deny, not 
merely assertorically, but also apodictically. (ibid.) 
  
The account is more fully developed by Stumpf (1939, 43f). We elucidate the concept 
of causation by recalling our awareness of drawing a conclusion and attending to what 
is given in this awareness.  
 The Würzburg-Vienna Plan is to show that concepts that Kant and others 
classified as a priori are in fact indefinable concepts derived by abstraction from 
perceptions. Though more controversial, the plan takes the concepts of truth and 
goodness to be derived in this way from perceptions. Brentano conjectured about 
truth: 
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No one would be illuminated by an analysis of the concept of the coloured if 
he had not already abstracted it from the intuition of individual colours. 
Perhaps we are faced, in the case of the sense of the term ‘true’, with a 
fundamental difference between judgments which can only be clarified by 
means of examples from our inner perception. (FCE, 87 [139]) 
 
This conjecture, Brentano argues, turns out to be true. The distinction between true 
and false judgements is ‘something elementary which one has to experience, just as 
one needs to have judged to know what judgment is.’ (KAE, 149; my translation).  
 Now, in OKRW Brentano seems to define the concepts of good and truth: x is 
good if, and only if x is correctly loved; x is true if, and only if, x is correctly judged. 
How is this compatible with his claim that truth is a primitive concept that can only be 
clarified by perceiving its instances, namely true judgements? The answer is that the 
‘definitions’ are not analytic definitions that decompose these concepts into marks. 
For ‘true’ (‘good’) is used in an extended sense: 
 
We use the expressions “true” and “false” in a number of quite different ways. 
Taking them in their strict and proper sense, we speak of true and false 
judgements; then modifying the meanings somewhat we also speak of true and 
false things, we when we speak of “a true friend” or “false gold”. It is hardly 
necessary to observe that when I spoke in the lecture [OKRW] of things being 
true and false, I was using the terms in their derivative sense and not in their 
strict and proper sense. (OKRW 48 [59]) 
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The basic concept of truth applies to judgements. It is indefinable, but one can call 
something true if it stands in a suitable relation to a true judgement. For example, 
Brentano’s explanation of the extended sense of ‘true’ in OKRW specifies a relation 
between the primary truth-bearer, judgement, and objects that are called true in the 
extended sense. These explanations don’t decompose the basic concept of truth, but 
allow us systematise different uses of ‘true’. 
In OCT Brentano gave what he called a ‘definition’ of the basic concept of 
truth: a judgement is true if, and only if, it judges an object correctly [zutreffend]. 
(OCT, 15-6 [26-7]) Brentano himself says that this ‘definition’ does not decompose 
the concept of truth into prior marks. For ‘[t]he expressions “to judge truly” and “to 
judge appropriately” would seem to be tautologically equivalent’ (OCT, 15 [27]). 
Brentano’s ‘definition’ is not an analytic definition, but a ‘nominal’ definition’ and he 
has a very pragmatic understanding of such definitions. The definiens of a nominal 
definition is an expression that has the same meaning as the definiendum but is ‘in 
some sense and in some relation more easy to comprehend’ than the definiendum 
(LRU, 85). The value of Brentano’s nominal definition for the understanding of truth 
lies in the fact that ‘correctness’ does not evoke the misleading idea of 
correspondence and it is in this respect easier to comprehend. The nominal definition 
helps breaking the spell the idea of truth as correspondence had over us (OCT, 15 
[27]). We will need to bear these points in mind when discussing Brentano’s Thesis.  
Further representative case studies that argue that contested concepts are 
abstracted from perception are: 
 Stumpf’s Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (1873) 
(On the Psychological Origin of the Presentation of Space) that implements 
the Würzburg-Vienna plan with respect to space: our notion of space is not an 
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a priori intuition, but derived from joint perception of extension and qualities 
like colour. Stumpf’s key-move is to argue that we can perceive many things 
together and thereby make room for perceiving spatial extension together with 
its filler. 
 Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) carries out the Würzburg-Vienna 
plan for cardinal number. Husserl starts by alerting his reader to the polysemy 
of ‘number’: ‘There are various concepts of number.’ (Husserl 1891, 1) He 
goes on to argue that they all depend on the concept of cardinal number; it is 
the core-concept. This concept is arrived at by abstraction from the perception 
of some things together. Sometimes we perceive these things/them and such 
perceptions are the basis for arriving at the concept of a set. 
 
Now we are equipped to approach Brentano’s philosophy of intentionality. Brentano’s 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is organised around his famous view of 
intentionality. How does it fit with the Würzburg-Vienna Plan? The clue is in the title. 
The book investigates psychological concepts from an empirical standpoint and one 
takes the empirical standpoint if one tries to find the ultimate origin of concepts in 
perception. In the next sections, I will argue that if we pay attention to Brentano’s 
methodology, we will arrive at a new understanding of Brentano’s Thesis. I will first 
outline the standard reading of the thesis and then develop my own. 
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4. The Text-Book Account of Brentano’s Thesis and Brentano’s Problem 
Brentano’s lasting influence on the philosophy of mind is due to what is now called 
‘Brentano’s Thesis’. The often-quoted and much discussed intentionality quote from 
Psychologie is:  
 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not with wholly unambiguous terminology, 
relation to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood 
here as a reality), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon 
includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the 
same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is 
affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.  
 This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental 
phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, 
therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena 
which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (PES, 68 [I, 124-5]) 
 
In general, philosophers of mind have taken Brentano to provide here non-circular, 
necessary and sufficient condition for something being a mental act or state. On this 
reading, Brentano’s Thesis is the following statement: 
 
Text-Book Brentano’s Thesis: x is a mental event/state if, and only if, x is 
directed towards an object. 
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Here are two representative examples of the Text-Book Thesis. 
 First, Dennett and Haugeland: 
 
Brentano claimed that intentionality is the defining distinction between the 
mental and the physical; all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality. 
(Dennett & Haugeland 1987, 481) 
 
On this rendering of Brentano’s Thesis, intentionality is necessary and sufficient for 
being a mental phenomenon.  
According to Dennett and Haugeland, Brentano’s Thesis also supports 
Mind/Brain Dualism: 
 
Since intentionality is, he claimed, an irreducible feature of mental 
phenomena, and since no physical phenomena could exhibit it, mental 
phenomena could not be a species of physical phenomena. This claim, often 
called the Brentano Thesis, or Brentano’s Irreducibility Thesis, has often been 
cited to support the view that the mind cannot be the brain, but this is by no 
means generally accepted today. (ibid.) 
 
The difficult question for physicalists is supposed to be ‘How can any physical object 
such as a brain be a mind, if minds have intentional states, but brains don’t?’10 I will 
come back to the so-called ‘Brentano’s problem’ in section seven. 
                                                        
10 The ‘classic formulation’ is Field 1978, 9. For discussion of this formulation, see 
Haldane 1989 and Moran 1998. Both, rightly in my view, point out that for Brentano 
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Secondly, Molnar: 
 
There is a theory, due to Franz Brentano (and scholastic predecessors) 
according to which intentionality is both necessary and sufficient for 
the psychological, and, conversely, non-intentionality is necessary and 
sufficient for the non-psychological. Intentionality provides the 
demarcation between the psychic and the physical. The theory, known 
as ‘the Brentano Thesis’, has become widely accepted in contemporary 
philosophy of mind. (Molnar 2004, 61) 
 
Now, the Text-Book Brentano’s Thesis gives rise to a number of problems that 
together make it look unpromising. 
First, the marks of a concept are other concepts that one can possess and 
explain independently of the concept one analyses. But the concept [directedness] or 
[having an object] seems not to fit this bill. On the face of it, the Text-Book 
Brentano’s Thesis is an explanation of something relatively clear – mental phenomena 
– in metaphorical terminology that is in need of explanation to be useful. To see this 
let us consider some explanation of the notion of intentionality. Findlay took the 
answer to the question ‘What is intentionality?’ to be grounded in our understanding 
of one of the senses of the preposition ‘of’: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
intentionality is not, as Field and others think, the property of possessing of 
propositional content. 
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A mere sense of grammatical propriety would in fact teach us Brentano’s 
doctrine, would tell us that most of our mental activities must be said to be of 
something. (Findlay 1961, 35) 
 
McIntire and Smith (1989, 147) agree: 
Many, perhaps most, of the events that make up our mental life – our 
perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, hopes, fears, and so on – have this characteristic 
feature of being “of” or “about” something and so giving us a sense of 
something in our world.  
 
As Findlay says only ‘most of our mental activities’ must be said to be of something. 
For many mental phenomena it seems strained and unmotivated to say that they are of 
something: my wondering who will win the Premiership is not of something. But let’s 
set this worry aside for the time being.  
The basic question is whether one can use our mastery of the preposition ‘of’ 
to get an initial grip on intentionality. We indeed say ‘I am thinking of Rome’ or ‘I am 
afraid of the monster’. Such sentences provide some guidance how to understand ‘of’, 
but not enough.11 For example, an infection is an infection of something – I have an 
infection of the ear – but is the infection directed towards the infected in the sense 
under discussion? An eclipse is an eclipse of, for example, the sun. Is it directed 
towards the sun? McIntire and Smith use scare quotes to avoid that the reader relies 
on one of the many the sense of ‘of’ in English. But if ‘a mere sense of grammatical 
propriety’ paired with knowledge of English is insufficient to understand Brentano’s 
Thesis, how is an appeal to ‘of’ helpful? 
                                                        
11 See Siewert 1998, 11-12. 
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The same goes for Brentano’s list of accusative constructions in the last quote 
from Psychologie. To repeat: 
 
In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or 
denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.  
 
It is grammatically correct to continue: 
 
In digestion something is digested, in fermentation something is fermented 
and so on. 
 
But is digestion intentional? It had better not be. For otherwise, a physical process 
would come out as a mental activity and the Text-Book Thesis would be falsified. 
Again, we are not helped towards an independently intelligible notion of 
intentionality via our mastery of a linguistic construction. The notion of directedness 
suggested by Brentano’s accusative construction allows for physical processes to be 
directed. A response to this problem is that only mental events can be of things that 
don’t exist.12 My thought can be ‘of’ Pegasus, although there is no such thing as 
Pegasus, the winged horse. But my infection cannot be of my ear, if there is no such 
thing as my ear. However, the idea that mental acts can be ‘of’ something, yet what 
they are ‘of’ need not exist, does not further understanding of this notion. Quite the 
opposite, it makes it more puzzling.  
Second, Brentano’s Thesis also comes under pressure from philosophers who 
point out that there are physical objects that are about something. The paradigm 
                                                        
12 See Ryle 1973, 259. 
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examples of physical intentionality are objects that have dispositions. If an object has 
a disposition, it is ‘oriented towards’ the manifestations of the disposition: 
 
a disposition is a state whereby the entity (substance), whose dispositional 
property it is, is orientated towards the coming about of a possible future state 
which does not now exist and may never do so, but which, if it does exist and 
thus becomes determinate, will constitute a manifestation of that disposition. 
(Place 1998, 105) 
 
If the magnet is disposed to attract iron, is it directed towards a future event of 
attracting of a piece of iron that is not yet actual and in fact may never happen?13  
 Third, if we have an intuitive grip on of-ness or being directed towards at all, 
obvious counter-examples arise of non-intentional mental states such as moods 
suggests themselves. Jacques’s depression is a mental state, but what is it about?14  
 Fourth, in the second edition Brentano himself made clear that the text-book 
reading was not the one he intended: 
 
When we said that reference to something as object is that which is most 
characteristic of mental activity, this should not be interpreted as though 
“mental activity” and “relation [Beziehung] to something as object” mean 
exactly the same thing. Just the opposite is already clearly apparent from 
what we have said about every mental activity relating to itself as object, not, 
however, primarily, but secondarily or, as Aristotle, by whom the fact had 
                                                        
13 See Martin & Pfeifer 1998 and Molnar 2004 chapter 3.4ff. 
14 For discussion of this problem for Brentano, see Crane 1998. 
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already been noticed, puts it, “incidentally” (“nebenbei”). (PES, 214/15 [I, 
138]; my emphasis) 
 
Brentano’s remark needs further explanation, but its general message is clear enough: 
Brentano’s Thesis does not say that the concept of a mental act/state can be analysed 
as something that has another thing as an object. Quite the opposite.  
In the next section, I will argue that all these worries speak against the Text-
Book Brentano’s Thesis, but not against Brentano’s Thesis. I will focus on the first 
and second problems because I take the third to be answered in the literature. 
 
5. Brentano’s Thesis  
The three problems just mentioned should make us wary of the Text-Book Brentano’s 
Thesis. Indeed philosophers find intentionality to be too fraught with problems and 
look for a replacement.15 But I think no such replacement is needed if we understand 
Brentano’s Thesis as it was intended to be understood. For the discussion of 
Brentano’s metaphilosophy has already primed us to reject the Text-Book Brentano’s 
Thesis. We have seen in sections 2 and 3 that Brentano is a Concept Empiricist: every 
concept is acquired either by abstraction from perception or by composing it from so 
acquired concepts. Concepts are studied by finding their origin. Brentano holds that 
central philosophical concepts turn out to be one’s that are abstracted from either 
                                                        
15 See Siewert (1998, 188), who proposes that the notion of correctness is less 
problematic. See also Crane 2009. The most influential replacement for intentionality 
is Chisholm 1955. He proposed to cash out intentionality in terms of intentional 
sentences. I will not discuss such replacements here. In my view, Kenny (1963, 199f) 
has convincingly shown that Chisholm’s replacement is insufficient. 
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inner or outer perceptions. Given all the unresolved problems with the Text-book 
Brentano’s Thesis, we should take inspiration from Brentano’s treatment of 
indefinable concepts when discussing Brentano’s Thesis. Let’s recall what he said 
about truth: 
 
No one would be illuminated by an analysis of the concept of the coloured if 
he had not already abstracted it from the intuition of individual colours. 
Perhaps we are faced, in the case of the sense of the term ‘true’, with a 
fundamental difference between judgments which can only be clarified by 
means of examples from our inner perception. (FCE, 87 [139]) 
 
The problems of conceptually articulating the mental makes a related conjecture 
plausible. Perhaps the concept [mental] is like the concept [coloured] or [true]. One 
can only acquire the concept [coloured] if something has looked coloured to one. 
Neither knowledge of a definition nor knowledge of a body of truths can compensate 
for perceptual awareness of colour. This feature of concept acquisition is also relevant 
for exercise of the concept. In deciding whether an object is blue or not we need, in 
the final instance, to look at it in good light and draw on our episodic memory of how 
blue things look. The same goes for the concept of the mental: it is an indefinable 
concept that can only be clarified by attending to retained awareness of mental acts.  
The assumption that the mental is a concept that cannot be clarified by 
decomposing it into independently intelligible marks is presupposed, but never 
articulated in Psychologie. In later work, Brentano made it explicit: 
 
The general character of everything mental, as it falls in our experience, is the 
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having of objects. What is said thereby cannot be made distinct without 
recourse to experience: just as it would be impossible to make the concept of 
red clear to a blind man, it is impossible to make the concept of love and hate 
clear to someone who has never loved and hated, and, the concept of thinking 
in general and in its most general sense in which it was used by Descartes to 
someone who has never apprehended himself as a thinker. One could not show 
such a person what one means when one says no thinking thing without an 
object of thought, no mental subject without an object. (O, 339; my translation 
and emphasis.) 
 
Brentano’s description of someone who has never apprehended himself as a thinker 
will strike contemporary readers as similar to Frank Jackson’s famous thought 
experiment.16 Mary knows every physical fact about colour. But she has lived in a 
black and white world. When she sees a red object for the first time, she learns 
something new. Jackson concludes that there are non-physical facts. 
 Compare now Franz. He knows all the physical facts about mental acts, but he 
has never paid attention to his own mental life. His attention has been absorbed by 
studying MRI scans. Now he discovers Brentano’s work and starts to train his 
attention on his own mental activities. When he does so successfully, does he learn 
something new? Yes, he notices a property that he did not notice before. If he knew 
all the physical facts about the mind before, he now comes to know something new, 
namely what is distinctive of the mental.  
 While Jackson takes his thought experiment to show that there are non-
physical facts, Brentano uses his to argue that the mental is a concept that can only be 
                                                        
16 See his 1982 and 1986. 
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elucidated by attending to instances of it. The concept of the mental, thinking in its 
most general sense, can only be grasped and clarified by attending to retained 
awareness of its instances, mental acts and processes. Mastery of it requires the ability 
to episodically recall and imagine mental acts. 
 Brentano’s methodology in Psychologie follows suit. We can only make clear 
what the mental is by paying attention to mental acts of which we were aware. In line 
with his other investigations about such concepts as causation Brentano argues  
 
(i) that the mental is distinguished from the physical by a property that can 
only be perceived in inner awareness,  
(ii) guiding us to have the right perceptions and directing our attention to the 
feature we should aware of.  
 
He takes the first step when he asks his readers to consider a list of examples: 
 
Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a coloured object, feeling warmth or cold, as 
well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. 
I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept, provided such a thing 
actually does occur. Furthermore, every judgement, every recollection, every 
expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a 
mental phenomenon. Also to be included under this term is every emotion: 
joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, 
intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc. (PES 60 [I, 111-2]) 
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The examples will jog our episodic memory and guide our imagination. We cannot, 
argued Brentano, attend to a mental act or process while it is ongoing, but we can 
recall it in episodic memory and then attend to it.17 What we find when we attend in 
this way to our mental activities is that, to use Brentano’s gloss, they all have an 
object. The focus on examples is exactly parallel to Brentano’s approach to the 
primitive concept of truth. Consider again his remark about the concept of truth: 
 
If, as I hope, we have succeeded in clarifying this cloudy concept, we have 
done so only by focusing primarily on examples of true judgements. […] 
(OCT, 17 [29]) 
 
 The second step is to direct his readers to focusing their attention on the right 
properties and relations when they are aware of their mental life. The different 
formulations of Brentano’s Thesis are supposed to do this. Again, Brentano is clear 
about this in later work: 
 
[We have given a positive determination of the mental] when we said that we 
have the mental as well as the physical “as an object” [zum Gegenstande 
haben]. This having something as an object is the feature of the mental that we 
are looking for; it is the common feature of everything mental that falls into 
our perception. Seeing is having a coloured thing as an object, believing is 
believing in something [Glauben an etwas], loving is loving something. Just 
as with any other elementary concept, this concept cannot be clarified other 
than by appeal to such examples. Nonetheless one had tried to by means of 
                                                        
17 See, for example, PES, 99 [I, 181]. 
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giving pictures and comparisons to further the noticing of the distinctive 
feature. One talked about the indwelling of the seen in the seeing, the object of 
thought in the thinker. Others thought to speak more clearly when they said 
that a sort of relation is involved, and called this relation, in contrast to a 
relation of comparison, the consciousness relation or the intentional relation. 
Such paraphrases may be helpful to make the apperception of the elementary 
feature easier, but of course they cannot replace it. (RP, 190-1; my translation 
and emphasis) 
 
Brentano reviews here his own attempts to characterise intentionality. As attempts to 
designate a property of mental acts, his characterisations of intentionality as  
 
directedness towards an object 
indwelling of an object 
non-comparative relation 
 
all fail. In Psychologie and other writings, Brentano warned his readers that the 
expressions he uses are ambiguous or misleading.18 The property under consideration 
can only be glossed over or approximated. But, as he says above, they were not meant 
to designate the property in the first place. They are metaphors that shall make the 
property salient to us when we attend to mental acts. We are all aware of mental acts, 
but our attention needs to be guided to have a determinate conception of it. We have 
to discern it from other properties of the mental that are also given in awareness. An 
analogy may help to make Brentano’s point. The professional wine taster is maybe 
                                                        
18 See PES, 68 [I, 124] and OKRW, 8 [16]. 
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aware of a distinctive property of the Sylvaner. Not only is he aware of it, he can 
discern and re-identify it. However, while the wine taster is aware of it, how can he 
bring it about that you are also aware of it? Merely bringing a bottle of Sylvaner along 
and letting you taste it will not suffice if the property does not naturally stand out. 
What he needs to do is to give you advice on how to discern the property when you 
taste the wine. He will say, ‘Do you get hay in the nose?’ and hope that you are able 
to attend to a property you are aware of that resembles hay. Brentano proceeds 
similarly. When he says, for example: 
 
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself 
 
or 
 
Every mental phenomenon is consciousness of an object 
 
he aims with the help of instructive metaphors to train your attention on a property 
you are aware of when you recall mental acts.  
In Psychologie Brentano called Brentano’s Thesis a definition of the mental. It 
is a definition in the same sense as the definition of truth is a definition. It is a 
nominal definition whose definiens helps one to apprehend the definiendum, but does 
not decompose it into independently understandable marks. 
 Heidegger got the nature of Brentano’s Thesis exactly right when he wrote: 
 
That the comportments-to [Verhaltungen]: presenting, judging, thinking, 
willing, are intentionally structured, is not a sentence that one can put down to 
memory and know in order to infer a conclusion from it, but it is an instruction 
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[Anweisung] to bring to mind what is meant by it, the structure of the 
relations, and constantly to reassure oneself of the validity of this statement. 
(Heidegger 1927, 92; my translation) 
 
In sum: Brentano’s Thesis is an instruction to attend to one’s mental life guided by 
suggestive metaphors, not a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions. When 
you follow Brentano’s guidance you will come to know an essential feature of the 
mental, but the words he uses don’t express the concept of this feature, they only 
guide you in finding it.  Brentano’s Thesis, if correctly understood, brings about that 
we come to know what is distinctive of thinking in the most general sense and if we 
generalise correctly that all and only mental phenomena possess this feature. But in 
order to do so we must think and pay attention to our thinking, analysing concepts 
will not help. 
With this in mind, we can address two problems that arise for the Text-Book 
Thesis.  
First, does Brentano explain the obscure – the mental – by means of the more 
obscure – intentionality? No, Brentano’s Thesis is not intended as an explanation of 
the mental in terms of a conceptually prior notion of directedness. No, consider again 
the end of the previous quote from Brentano about coming to know what is distinctive 
of thinking in its most general sense: 
 
One could not show such a person [who has not apprehended himself as 
thinking] what one means when one says no thinking thing without an object 
of thought, no mental subject without an object. (O, 339) 
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The notion of intentionality or having an object and therefore Brentano Thesis is not 
intelligible at all to someone who has not attended to his mental acts. When Brentano 
says that a mental act is directed, a relation to some content, or ‘of’ something, he 
gives us pointers that enable us to become acquainted with what we label 
‘intentionality’. Talk of ‘of’ etc. is not intended to be independently intelligible and to 
describe a feature of the mental. It is supposed to guide someone who is aware of his 
mental life and can attend to mental acts when he recalls them to one feature that they 
all share. Brentano’s pointers are not explanations of intentionality that are intelligible 
independently of attending to mental acts. 
Second, Brentano’s Thesis does not land us in ontological problems. When I 
guide your attention to an experienced feature by a metaphor like ‘tastes of liquorice’, 
I don’t strictly and literally mean that the wine tastes this way. Similarly, while 
Brentano says in Psychologie that mental acts are ‘relations’, he also points out that 
they are not literally relations. But when we attend to our mental acts, saying that they 
are ‘relations’ helps us to home in on the right feature. So of course a mental act is not 
literally a relation to something: only in a liberal or loose sense can we speak of a 
relation; mental acts are ‘quasi-relational’.19 Since mental acts are not relations, 
literally speaking, we don’t need to look for relata in the case of hallucinations etc. 
 
6. Acquaintance with Intentionality  
Brentano’s Thesis is formulated with the aim to make us aware of and attend to the 
directedness of our mental activities. In Russell’s terminology, the aim is to get us to 
be acquainted with intentionality. Why is that an aim worth pursuing?  
                                                        
19 See PES, 212 [I, 134]. 
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 The concepts [having an object] as well as [mental] are primitive concepts. 
We need perceive the properties they present to grasp them. In order to see this let us 
consider the concept [blue]. Why are we not satisfied with a description like ‘the 
colour of the sky’, but go and look to the sky to acquire the concept properly? 
Johnston answers: 
Perception represents itself as (or is at least spontaneously taken by its 
possessors as) a mode of access to the nature of things. When I see the sun 
setting against the magenta expanse of the sky, I seem to have something 
about the nature of the sky and sun revealed to me. (Johnston 1993, 257) 
 
And, he continues, we take pleasure in and value knowledge of the nature of things. 
Such knowledge can for some things only be found in (non-epistemic) perception. 
The nature of blue is revealed to me when something looks blue to me and I pay 
attention to the colour it displays by comparing and contrasting it. The knowledge we 
covet cannot be acquired by coming to know propositions regarding the colours.  
 Outer perception represents itself as mode of access to sensible properties; 
inner perception or awareness, if combined with episodic recall, represents itself as a 
mode of access to the nature of the mental. We come to know the nature of mental 
acts by being aware of them and training our attention to them. Guided by Brentano’s 
advice, we will come to know an essential feature of mental acts and this feature 
itself. 
 It is a further step from knowledge of an essential feature of the mental to 
Brentano’s Thesis that all and only mental acts are intentional. Brentano takes care of 
the ‘all’ by induction: 
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Induction plays, as it does in other empirical sciences, the main role in 
descriptive psychology, for instance, that every mental phenomenon is 
directed to an object. (GÄ, 37; my translation) 
 
How can we convince ourselves that only mental acts are intentional? If the nature of 
intentionality is fully revealed in awareness, any property or relation whose nature is 
not revealed in this way is not intentionality.  
 We are now in a position to answer the objection that the existence of physical 
intentionality shows Brentano’s Thesis to be wrong. The concept [having an object] is 
supposed to be a concept that one can only acquire and master if one has been aware 
of mental acts and events that fall under it. In contrast, Place’s concept [oriented 
towards] can be acquired by observing dispositions under different conditions. If 
Lewis is right, it can even be analysed in terms of counterfactuals.20 Hence, 
intentionality is one form in which one thing can be related to another, [oriented 
towards] a different one. Therefore Brentano’s claim that only mental acts and states 
exhibit intentionality is not falsified by the suggestive description of objects ‘being 
oriented towards’ the manifestations of their dispositions. In general, sometimes the 
essence of one thing involves another. It is essential for a boundary to bound an 
object; it is essential for a disposition to dispose an object to certain manifestations; 
that is, it is part of our understanding of what it is for an object to have a disposition 
to be disposed to such manifestations. But it is not only essential that mental acts 
‘have an object’; we can only have non-propositional knowledge of what the so-
glossed essential property is by instantiating it in mental acts and being conscious of 
                                                        
20 See Lewis 1997. 
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it. This is different for the orientation of dispositions and hence we should keep 
intentionality and orientation apart.  
 
7. Brentano’s Problem Revisited 
Did Brentano pose a challenge for physicalists by providing a mark of mental 
phenomena? It seems so. For he wrote: 
 
This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental 
phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, 
therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena 
which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (PES, 68 [I, 124-5]) 
 
However, Brentano’s Thesis speaks neither in favour of nor against physicalism. 
Again, one can explain this by exploiting the analogy between our concepts of colours 
and the concept of intentionality.  
 I see a red object in good light and it looks red to me. In this situation I know 
the nature of the colour, a disposition whose nature is revealed to me in perception. 
This knowledge is compatible with ignorance of the contingent facts which make the 
object possess redness: 
 
Of course one does not thereby know the facts concerning how in general the 
disposition is specifically secured or realized. But theses are facts concerning 
the disposition’s contingent relations to other properties. They do not concern 
the intrinsic and essential nature of the disposition. (Johnston 1993, 257-8) 
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The same colour may and often is in fact realised by different physical facts, for 
example, different surface properties. So one can know what the colour is, know its 
essence, without knowing all contingent facts about the colour.  
 We find something similar for the mental. When I am aware of a mental act 
and pay attention to it, I acquire non-propositional knowledge of what ‘having an 
object’ is and what the nature of mental acts consists in. This knowledge cannot be 
undermined or improved by coming to know propositions about intentionality and the 
mental. But my non-propositional knowledge is of course incomplete. For example, 
whether being directed on something depends on or consists in physical facts – and if 
so, which – I don’t know. 
 How could Brentano assume otherwise? In fact, he does not. The last 
quotation makes clear that he holds that physical phenomena are not intentional. Now, 
physical phenomena are not physical states or events: 
 
Examples of physical phenomena […] are a colour, a figure, a landscape 
which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as 
similar images which appear in the imagination. (PES, 61 [I, 112]) 
 
Physical phenomena are the objects of outer perception. We know a chord, a colour or 
an odour ‘perfectly and completely’ when we perceive them.21 When we know them 
in this way, we are not aware of anything that merits the label ‘directedness’. It is not 
part of the nature of physical phenomena to be directed onto something; it is part of 
the nature of mental phenomena to have this directedness. 
                                                        
21 See Russell 1912, 25. 
 32 
 The distinction between mental and physical phenomena leaves open whether 
mental phenomena are exercises of physical powers or realised in physical 
mechanisms or physical phenomena are exercises of mental powers. It does not 
pronounce on the contingent properties of mental and physical phenomena.  
 Brentano argued, in fact, against materialism.22 But he is also perfectly clear 
that one cannot argue for materialism only on the basis of our awareness of the 
mental. Our awareness of mental phenomena is evident, but incomplete. For example, 
it is often proposed that only physical things are in space. Brentano is wary of this 
mark of the mental. For: 
  
It is compatible with the evidence of [awareness] that our mental activities 
possess spatial determination, but these don’t appear to us. (RP, 223; my 
translation) 
 
Awareness reveals to us the nature of mental phenomena, but it does not reveal to us 
all properties of mental phenomena; awareness is, for instance, silent about spatial 
determinations judgements etc.  So how could a distinction of mental and physical 
phenomena that is grounded in our awareness speak in favour of or against 
materialism (see ibid.)? Brentano’s arguments against materialism make therefore no 
use of observations about intentionality. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The contemporary discussion of Brentano’s Thesis assumed that  
 
                                                        
22 See RP, 228ff. 
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(i) Brentano’s Thesis is the statement of an analytic definition that provides a 
mark of the concept of the mental; 
(ii) the concept of intentionality can be mastered independently of the concept 
of the mental;  
(iii) the mental comprises mental states and acts. 
 
However, Brentano rejected (i) to (iii). Brentano’s Thesis is a guideline to discover 
one feature of mental acts when one attends to them in episodic memory. The concept 
of the mental can only be elucidated if one is able to have mental acts and attend to 
them. Brentano’s Thesis is an advice directed to a thinker to attend in the right way to 
his mental life to become acquainted with the essential, but conceptually primitive 
feature of the mental. If it is carried out successfully, we come to know a feature that 
all and only mental phenomena essentially have. ‘Intentionality’ is a label for this 
primitive, but introspectible feature of mental acts. If we want to assess Brentano’s 
Thesis, we need to engage with this conception and not the Text-Book Thesis. I will 
leave this assessment to another occasion.23 But it should be clear from what has been 
said so far that we need to approach Brentano’s Thesis in a different way from the 
Text-Book Thesis.24  
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